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PENDING OIL AND GAS LITIGATION
WHAT’S HAPPENING AND WHAT’S
COMING
BY: DAVID F. BUTLER
Introduction
Due to the price of oil and gas, the thousands of new mineral owners who
are now interested in the laws pertaining to oil and gas, the government’s
eagerness to get its share of the revenue, and new attorneys who have taken a new
look at old law, there is a lot going on in the oil and gas industry.  My discussion
will concern cases or issues that are pending, and litigation the oil and gas industry
will face in the next few years.  
The Strohacker Doctrine
Bob Honea, an attorney in Fort Smith, has been kind enough to provide me
with the pleadings in one case that he has tried, and in two other cases that are
pending.  These cases concern the Strohacker doctrine.  Tom Daily will discuss
case that was decided in 2007 by Judge Eisele in federal court, and I’ll address the
issues in the other two pending cases.  
In 1975, at the Arkansas Natural Resources Oil and Gas Institute, another
distinguished attorney from Fort Smith, Gerald Delung, presented the Strohacker
Doctrine in great detail.  Mr. Delung called it an “Arkansas Rule of Property.”  He
said so because this rule does not exist in other oil and gas states, nor does it create
the confusion it has created in Arkansas, particularly in light of the voluminous
number of reservations that took place in the Fayetteville Shale area in the late
1800’s and early 1900’s that now puts landmen and title attorneys in a
predicament. 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY V. STROHACKER
The Strohacker case is properly styled, Missouri Pacific Railroad
Company v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W. 2d 587 (1941).  The Strohacker
Doctrine necessitates that a factual determination be made as to the true intent of
the parties at the time of the original reservation, and the Arkansas Supreme Court
has stated it is appropriate to rely upon the contemporary facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument in question, and has determined it is
proper to ascertain the intent of the parties so as to be consistent with and limited
to those minerals commonly known and recognized by legal or commercial usage.  
For those for you who have not encountered Strohacker, the reservation is
as follows:
“…reserving, however, all coal and mineral deposits”
PENDING STROHACKER CASES
Tom Daily has already discussed with you the Faulkner County case heard
by Judge Eisele in federal court last year.  Two other cases are pending, both in
White County.  One case involves Hallwood/Anadarko as entities that succeeded
to the interest of the railroad.  The other case involves Upland Industrial
Development Company.  In both cases, landowners who acquired their interests in
the 60’s, 70’s or later have now challenged the interests that are claimed by the
railroad or its successor.  One case involves a reservation made in the mid 1920’s,
and the other case involves a reservation made in the mid 1930’s.  Two issues are
of interest in this litigation:
1. Federal Court Jurisdiction
One of the cases concerns with the issue of whether or not the damages
requested are sufficient for the minimum jurisdiction of $75,000.00 in controversy. 
To acquire federal court jurisdiction, you need diversity jurisdiction, and a
minimum of $75,000.00 in damages claimed.  There is trial strategy ongoing by
the lawyers on both sides in regard to which court (state or federal) will hear the
case.  Since Judge Eisele made his ruling, naturally a party representing a railroad
or its successor would want to be in federal court.  Federal judges are appointed by
the President, and serve for life.  Circuit Court judges are elected every few years,
and they are very much concerned about their constituency.  Since a precedent has
been set in federal court, I would want to be in Circuit Court, and perhaps I would
want a jury trial in White County if I represented the landowner.  
2. “Commonly Known” or “Commercially Viable Minerals”
Under the rule of Strohacker, a generic reservation of mineral rights and an
instrument conveying real property of the sort described above has been construed
to include only those minerals commonly known or recognized by legal and
commercial usage.  What does this mean for the landmen and attorneys who have
to deal with these issues?  
Strohacker necessitates a fact finding mission determining whether or not
oil and gas was “commonly known” in the community.  In one of the cases, it is
argued that at the time the reservation was made, the mineral must be
“commercially viable at that time in that county.” The argument is that at that time
there was no CNN or C-Span, and newspapers did not exist at that time in certain
areas.  White County has a large geographic area, and maybe one hand didn’t
know what the other was doing.  The argument is that in one part of the county, the
public’s knowledge may be different than that of another part of the county and
it’s a face question as to what is “commonly known.”  
By this time next year, we will know a lot more.  Here’s what we do know
so far:
1. In 1892 and 1893, oil and gas was not commonly thought to a
mineral in Miller County, Arkansas. (Strohacker case)
2. In 1937, a conveyance reserving “mineral rights” was effective to
withhold oil and gas and other minerals from the conveyance.  Shepard v. Zeppa,
Trustee 199 Ark.1, 133 S.W.2d 86 (1939).
3. In 1938, according to the recent federal court ruling from Faulkner
County, oil and gas was a mineral commonly known or recognized by legal and
commercial usage within the meaning of Strohacker.  This reservation contained
the following language:
“reserving to Mopac all the minerals, upon in and under said land”
That’s what we know for now.  We’ll update you next year.
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
One issue that is pending and will be a problem, particularly for landmen,
concerns the following provision in an oil and gas title opinion:
“The interest of Farmer Brown is subject to an outstanding 
mortgage in favor of ABC Bank.  This mortgage was in effect prior 
to execution of Farmer Brown’s oil and gas lease.  You should 
secure a subordination agreement from the bank.”
What’s the big deal?  There is no question the mortgagee’s rights are
superior to that of the leasehold owner under this scenario.  What happens to your
lease if the bank refuses to execute a subordination agreement?  Normally, nothing
happens, the well is drilled, and life is good.  Life is good until Farmer Brown
defaults on the terms and conditions of the mortgage agreement.  Then what?  The
easy answer is to simply not pay to Lessor the bonus money until the bank comes
on board.  In other words, tell Farmer Brown that he has to get the bank to sign a
subordination agreement or another document that will accomplish the same goal
prior to paying the bonus.  
What happens if Farmer Brown is given the opportunity to lease from a
competitor, and your company refuses to pay the bonus money in the absence of a
subordination agreement? What happens if Farmer Brown defaults, you are 30
days from spudding the well, or if the well has been drilled and waiting on a
pipeline, or what if the well is producing?  If Farmer Brown defaults, your remedy
is to form a real estate company, and go to the sale at the Courthouse steps to make
sure that the bank does not become an unleased mineral owner, or else the bank is
now your partner if it is the high bidder at the public sale.  
You will have no choice but to make sure your interest is protected at the
sale.  I suggest that you intervene in the foreclosure case, and see if you can get the
parties to agree to a subordination agreement.  The mortgagee will not own the
mineral interests unless it is the high bidder.  The bank simply owns a mortgage on
the lands, and the lands will be owned by the party purchasing the lands at the
foreclosure sale.    
CHESAPEAKE TRIES TO INTEGRATE THE BANK
Chesapeake successfully integrated a few mortgagees through the
integration process, and actually paid the bank additional bonus money to insure
that this interest was under the terms and conditions of a lease.  The problem
comes with the definition of “owner.”  
WHAT THE HECK IS AN “OWNER”
Under A.C.A. §15-72-102 (7) “owner” is defined as follows:  
“Owner means the person who has the right to drill into and to 
produce from any pool, and to appropriate the production either for 
himself, or for himself and another, or others”
In two administrative hearings, the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission
(AOGC) made a ruling that under the definition of the word “owner” as written
above, the non-subordinating bank, (also known as a shifting executory interest) is
not included within the word “owner.”  The AOGC was concerned it did not have
the statutory authority to integrate this type of interest.  Chesapeake argued the
following:
1. Historically, the AOGC has integrated dower and curtesy interests.
2. Historically, the AOGC has integrated term mineral interests .
(grantor reserves minerals for a term of years)
3. The contingent interest of the lending agency, even if it may not 
vest, is a type of interest contemplated under the definition of 
“owner.”
Dower and Curtesy Interests and Term Mineral Interests
In regard to dower and curtesy interests, dower and curtesy interests are not
interests that presently exist in that these interests do not actually vest until a
spouse dies.  In other words, you have an inchoate interest.  In regard to a term
mineral interest, it is an interest that will vest at some point in time, but a person or
entity owning a term mineral interest would not have the present right to drill.  
AOGC ORDERS
An Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission order includes the following
language:
“This order is binding on heirs, successors and assigns.”
I found no statutory authority which enables the AOGC to make the order
binding on parties who were not subject to the order.  The argument from the
AOGC is that dower or curtesy interests or term mineral interests would be “heirs,
successors or assigns.”  
APPEAL
Under the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act, an appeal from an
order issued by the AOGC can be appealed to the Circuit Court in the County in
which the real property is located, or the appeal can be filed in Pulaski County. 
One appeal has a White county case and the other from Faulkner County. 
Chesapeake elected to file one action in Pulaski County, and consolidated the two
cases without objection from the AOGC.  A motion for judgment on the pleadings
was filed by the AOGC.  Chesapeake has asked that the matter be set for a hearing. 
The case is pending.
AOGC HAS NO DOG IN THIS FIGHT
This is a case where the litigants are really not at odds with each other. 
The AOGC really does not have a dog in this fight, and it would certainly not
bother the AOGC if the Circuit Court were to rule the word “owner” includes this
type of interest.  In the event the Circuit Court finds the word “owner” means that
it is a “present owner” as opposed to a contingent owner, then the remedy would
be to address this issue at the legislative level.  Chesapeake filed this action in part
to be able to make the argument that it had exhausted all legal remedies prior to
approaching the legislature for relief.  In the event the Circuit Court denies the
relief requested by Chesapeake, then the word “owner” needs to be redefined or
expanded based upon recent hearings at the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission in
January, 2008.  
DOES “OWNER” REALLY MEAN “RECORD TITLE OWNER”
Chesapeake was once again involved with the issue of the definition of
“owner.”  Storm Cat had filed an integration application.  The issue presented in
the Storm Cat case concerned a determination of whether or not, for purposes of an
integration proceeding, a party to an integration is an owner if the documentation
making the person an “owner” is not recorded in the Circuit Clerk’s records. 
Several questions came up at this particular integration proceeding.  These issues
concerned who should be named the operator.  
OPERATOR CHALLENGE HELPS FORM THE
DEFINITION OF “OWNER”
In the first instance, the argument was made that on the date an integration
application was filed, record title indicated the non-applicant did not own a
working interest that would have justified an operator challenge.  The next
question to present itself was at what point in time, for the purpose of an
integration proceeding, a non-applicant can make a claim it has an interest even
though it may not be recorded.  Another question concerns whether or not actual
notice of an unrecorded interest is enough to justify being named the operator.  At
an AOGC hearing, as a general rule, “He who has the largest working interest, or
the support of the greatest percentage of working interests gets named “operator.”
1. Record Title Owner
Chesapeake argued that for the purposes of integration, the AOGC had not
historically used the standard that the word “owner” meant record title owner.  For
example, in this industry, exploration agreements, seismic exploration agreements,
farmout and various other agreements are entered into between companies that are
not recorded.  A typical farmout agreement provides that company will sign a
letter agreement wherein the company is given the right to drill a well on lands,
and if the entity secures oil and gas production, then an assignment of record will
be made.  A general rule, if you were to examine title, record title would be in the
entity who farmed the interest out, and not the farmoutee.
If the AOGC Commission had ruled the word “owner” means record title
owner, then it would be necessary for all agreements to be recorded.  In regard to
the question that the assignment had not been recorded as of the date the
application was filed, and the argument that the assignment was not recorded until
the day of the integration hearing, the AOGC ruled that this assignment was
effective, and named Chesapeake the operator even though the assignment was not
of record prior the application being filed, and was not actually filed of record
until the day of the hearing.  To avoid this peril, I suggest you record some
document signed by the record title owner which makes reference to your
agreement.
2. Option to Lease & Lack of Consideration
The second issue that concerns the definition of “owner” is much more
complex.  Chesapeake had secured an option to lease from a mineral owner.  One
of the terms and conditions of the lease option provided that lease would not be
recorded.  At the integration hearing, the only document filed of record was an
“option to lease.”  The Applicant, One Tech (now Petrohawk), did not inquire of
Chesapeake whether or not the option to lease had been exercised, and sent an
integration application to the Commission claiming that this entity was unleased
because there was nothing of record except the “option to lease.”  
Chesapeake contended the option to lease had been exercised.  In fact,
testimony was received that a lease covering the lands had been executed, but it
had not been recorded based upon the agreement between the parties that the lease
not be recorded.  Chesapeake testified it intended to file a memorandum of lease in
the future.  Another argument was made that even if the option had been exercised,
full consideration had not been paid for the lease.  There was no dispute that
Chesapeake had paid a considerable amount of money for the option, and once the
option to lease had been exercised, Chesapeake was required to pay the bonus
monies after completing due diligence.  Once Chesapeake exercised its option to
lease, there was a binding contract which required paying an agreed upon bonus
times the number of mineral acres that were owned by the mineral owner.  
This issue concerns whether or not an the word “owner” is defined as
including an entity when there has been no recorded lease, and full consideration
had not been paid because the consideration was to be paid after the completion of
due diligence.  There was a split decision by the AOGC.  In fact, the decision was
split 4-4 (one commissioner was absent.)  The AOGC compromised and ruled 
“we don’t know the answer to this” and the parties were ordered to secure a title
opinion to prove title.  
OPERATOR
Under A.C.A. § 15-72-201, the word “operator” is defined as follows:
“ the person who has the right to enter upon the lands of another for
the purposes of exploring, drilling, and developing for the 
production of brine, oil, gas, and all other petroleum hydrocarbons.”
In a typical real estate action, for example, if a party wanted to sue an
entity in a real property lawsuit, it would be necessary to sue the person who had
record title.  Two of the commissioners are lawyers, and they have some issues
concerning “record title” or “failure to pay consideration.”  Several questions came
up in this regard.  
1. Not of Record
If, in fact, Storm Cat had been deemed the Operator, and their claim was
accurate that since the assignment was not of record, and they, therefore, had the
largest working interest, could Chesapeake have simply waited behind the eight
ball and done nothing?  If the Applicant had knowledge that a lease has been
executed, but the lease was not of record, even though they had been notified that a
lease had been secured, would they be required to pay additional bonus monies to
a Lessor when they had notice this entity had leased to another company.  Could
Storm Cat have then still drilled the well and taken all the risks, and then
Chesapeake come back into the unit as a tenant in common?  
2. Consideration
In regard to the One Tech scenario, there was a contention the
consideration for the lease had not been paid.  Again, assuming there was actual
notice given to the applicant integrating the unit, would Applicant have to pay
additional bonus monies to this entity?  Does the language “this order shall be
binding on heirs, successors or assigns” save Applicant from a dilemma wherein
they are merely a tenant in common with an entity when they had actual notice
they had leased the interest to another party?  I am unaware of any cases wherein
this dilemma has been adjudicated.  What if a party leases their interests to another
party between the date of the integration and the date the integration order is sent
out?  If it’s a working interest owner, are they automatically deemed non-consent
if they do not make an election since Applicant did not notice them?  Can they be
considered a “carried interest?”
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ROYALTY:
WILL THAT DOG HUNT?
There are a couple of adverse possession cases, one pending and one
brewing down in south Arkansas. These two cases have different facts, but the
interesting issue concerns whether or not you can adversely possess royalty in
some circumstances.  In the first case, a warranty deed conveys property with no
reservation of minerals.  Grantor sells land to a timber company with the following
language included:
“Grantee acknowledges that this conveyance is subject to existing 
oil and gas leases and all mineral reservations exiting as of the date 
of this transaction.”
On the date of the transaction, the apparent intent of the parties was for the
Grantor to reserve the minerals, and for the timber company to purchase the
surface only.  In this situation, there were three existing stripper oil wells located
on the lands on the date the warranty deed was executed.  Some royalty was being
paid on the date of the execution of the warranty deed, but not much.
Since minimum royalty was being paid, it is believed Grantee was unaware
it actually owned the minerals, and Grantee did nothing to transfer by division
order the interests from Grantor to Grantee in regard to the three producing wells. 
The wells produced for in excess of seven years with Grantor receiving the royalty
from the three producing wells.  Approximately 8 ½ years after the warranty deed
was recorded, a landman putting together a prospect notified Grantee that it owned
the minerals, and Grantee initially denied that it owned the minerals.  The landman
convinced Grantee that it indeed did own the minerals.  Grantee then signed a new
lease covering all the acreage.  Grantee then contacted the purchaser, and got the
royalty transferred from Grantor to Grantee in the division order department.
1. Severed Mineral Interests
It is theoretically possible to adversely possess minerals, if, for a statutory
period of 7 years, a party has possessed the mineral.   The Arkansas Supreme
Court has consistently held that when title to the surface estate of land has been
severed from title to the underlying mineral estate, title to the minerals cannot be
acquired by adverse possession of the surface alone.  Actual production of
minerals is required.  In Claybrooke v. Barnes, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S.W. 2d 390
(1929) for example, the Arkansas Supreme Court held as follows:  
“When there has been a severance of the legal interest in the 
minerals from the ownership of the land, it has been held as to solid
minerals, and the same rule has been applied to oil and gas, that 
adverse possession of the land is not adverse possession of the 
mineral estate and does not defeat the separate interest in it…. So, it
may be taken as settled that the two estates, when once separated, 
remain independent, and title to the mineral rights can never be 
acquired by merely holding and claiming the land, even though title
be asserted in the minerals all the time.”
The rationale for this is that “the statute of limitations does not run against
these rights [to severed mineral interests,] unless there is an actual adverse
holding, which constitutes an invasion of these particular rights.  Adverse
possession, whether of the surface or severed minerals, must be open and
notorious (meaning highly visible) and inconsistent with rights of the true owner. 
The only way to make a visible claim to the minerals is to sink a mine shaft or drill
a well and then to use that shaft or well to actually remove the mineral.
2. Production from a Unit Well Not on the Tract
The second case involves a term royalty interest wherein the purchaser
continued to pay royalty after the term had expired, again, far in excess of 7 years. 
In addition to the requirement that an adverse possessor must actually extract the
minerals, there is an unresolved question in Arkansas as to whether production
from a unit well that is not situated on the tract in issue is sufficient to constitute
adverse possession.  Such production has been held to be insufficient in Oklahoma,
but there is some indication that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not adopt such
an approach.  In Post v. Tenneco Oil Co., 278 Ark 527, 648 S.W. 2d 42 (1983), the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that a lessor’s entitlement to “free gas” from wells
located on the leased premises included the off-premises unit wells.  In Post, the
court noted that the unit wells produced gas from under the leased premises and
that royalties were paid on a unit basis.  In Brizzolara v. Powell,  214 Ark. 870, 218
S.W. 2d 728 (1949), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that adjoining production
under a voluntary pooling agreement did not constitute adverse possession of gas,
but the court offered the following dicita:
“It is possible that the rule might be different if the neighboring 
well had been drilled in accordance with a finding in the Oil and 
Gas Commission that such a well would drain surrounding 
property, necessitating the formation of a drilling unit” but that 
situation has not presented itself as of this date.
3. Erroneous Payments- Adverse Possession
In Warmack v. Henry H. Cross Co., 237 Ark. 869, 377 S.W. 2d 47 (1964),
the Arkansas Supreme Court essentially said that an erroneous payment of royalty
did not translate into adverse possession based upon the fact the wrong party was
paid in excess of 7 years.  Language from Warmack of significance is as follows:
“Appellant’s argument would seem to boil down to the fact that 
because Appellant has been overpaid for the last 25 years, he should
continue to be overpaid” 
In Palmer v. Lide, 567 S.W. 2d 295 (1978), the Arkansas Supreme Court
once again looked at Warmack and said:
“In a case so similar as to be controlling we held that there was no 
adverse possession or acquiescence where the real title holders did 
not know that the company owning the oil runs was overpaying one 
royalty owner on the mistaken premises that his interest was twice 
as large as it actually was.  That the appellant erroneously received 
and kept overpayments for several years does not give her any 
equitable ground for contending that the same error should continue 
in the future.”
The two pending cases are distinguishable from Warmack and Palmer in
that both of these cases involve the grantee receiving a portion of the royalty
payments, but, arguably not the full amount.  It was argued the error on the part of
the purchaser or the division order department would not translate into adverse
possession.  In the two pending cases, the grantee received “no” royalty payments
for in excess of 7 years.  
We’ll let you know next year what happened.
LITTLE RED RIVER- 
WHO OWNS THE MINERALS UNDER THE RIVER?
In the Fayetteville Shale play, the owner of minerals under the
Little Red River and adjoining the river is at issue.  Landowners have
been taking the position they own the minerals, and up until a few
weeks ago, the State of Arkansas agreed with them.
Attorney General Opinion No. 1998-312 says: 
"The State of Arkansas, of course, owns title to the beds of all navigable
waterways within the state. See Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680, 496 S.W.2d 372
(1973); Clarke v. Montgomery County, 268 Ark. 942, 597 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. App.
1980); McGahhey v. McCollum, 207 Ark. 180, 179 S,W, 2d 661 (1944); Barboro v.
Boyle, 119 Ark. 149, 167 S.W. 854 (1914). It has been stated that: 
When the Original Colonies ratified the Constitution, they
succeeded to the Crown's title and interest in the beds of navigable
waters within their respective borders. See Utah Division of State
Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-96, 107 S.Ct. 2318, 2320-
21, 96 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S.
313, 317-318,94 S.Ct, 517, 521-522,38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), overruled on
other grounds, Oregon ex. reI. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 636, 97 S.Ct. 582, 50 L.Ed. 2d 550 (1977).
Under the equal footing doctrine, new states were admitted with "the
same rights, coverignty and jurisdiction… as the original States
possess within their respective borders,' Bonelli, 414 U. S. at 318, 94
S.Ct. At 522. Accordingly, title to lands beneath navigable waters
passed from the federal government to the states upon their
admission to the Union. 
101 Ranch v. U.S. 905 F.2d 180,182 (8  Cir. 1990). th
This is true assuming there had been no valid federal grant of particular land to an
individual prior to the state’s admission to the Union. Utah Division of State Lands
v. United States, supra. 
IS THE LITTLE RED “NAVIGABLE”
As regards lands still underwater, or below the ordinary high water mark, common
law principles must be applied. It is held in Arkansas, in contrast to the majority of
states, that because the state's title to the land under water rests on navigability,
when the navigation ceases the title terminates, and riparian rights attach. See
Parker, Commissioner of Revenue v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811, 262 S.W.2d 891
(1953), relying on Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781 (8  Cir. 1906). See also Unitedth
States v. Kennean, supra; Gill v. Porter, supra; Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas
Co., supra and Five Lakes Outing Club v. Horseshoe Lake Protective Association,
226 Ark. 136, 288 S.W.2d 942 (1956). Compare 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters 97. A
determination, therefore, of the title to the lands still under water will require a
finding as to the water’s  navigability. This is an inherently factual question. If no
longer "navigable” Arkansas common law provides that riparian ownership attaches at
the time the waters became nonnavigable.  See Keenan, supra, and Gill v. Porter,
supra. 
In AR. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 83 Ark. App. 276, 126
S.W.3d 738 (2003) the Court of Appeals wrote; 
Determining the navigability of a stream is essentially a matter of deciding if
it is public or private property. State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d
659 (1980), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 843 (1980). If a body of water is navigable,
it is considered to he held by the State in trust for the public. See Hayes v.
State, 254 Ark. 680, 496 S.W.2d 372 (1973); 9 Powell on Real Property
62.11 (2)(a) (2003). Navigability is a question of fact. Goforth v. Wilson, 208
Ark. 35, 184 S. W .2d 814 (1945).
 
                                                                 **
 
DEFINITION OF  “NAVIGABILITY”
Arkansas law has defined navigability as follows: 
The true criterion is the dictate of sound business common sense, and
depends on the usefulness of the stream to the population of its banks,
as a means of carrying off the products of their fields and forests, or
bringing to them articles of merchandise. If, in its natural state, without
artificial improvements, it may be prudently relied upon and used for that
purpose at some seasons of the year, recurring with tolerable regularity, then
in the American sense, it was navigable ... 
Milroy, 268 Ark. at 234-35, 595 S.W.2d at 663 (quoting Lutesville Sand &
Gravel Co. v. McLaughlin, 181 Ark. 574, 26 S.W.2d 892 (1930)). In 1980,
this definition was expanded by the Arkansas Supreme Court to include
consideration of the water's recreational use as well as its commercial use in
determining navigability. McIlroy, supra. In McIlroy, the court was asked to
determine whether a stream that had considerable recreational value for
boating and fishing was navigable, even though i t  lacked the commercial
adaptability that was the hallmark of traditional navigability. 
MULBERRY RIVER CASE
One of the major river cases involves the Mulberry River.  The Mulberry
River, in MccIlroy, was described in the opinion as an intermediate stream at least
100 feet wide at some points, that for fifty to fifty-five miles of its length could be
and often was floated by canoes or flat-bottomed boats. The Mulberry was
designated by the state Department of Parks and Tourism as Arkansas's finest white
water float stream. In 1838, it was “meandered” by surveyors, which is prima facie
evidence of navigability. Based on these facts, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that "there is no about that the segment of the Mulberry River that is involved in
this lawsuit can be used for a substantial portion of the year for recreational
purposes. Consequently, we hold that it is navigable .. ." McIlroy, 268 Ark. at
237,595 S.W.2d at 665. 
IS A RIVER’S PRESENT-DAY NAVIGABILITY RELEVANT?
In McIlroy, one party Appellee contended that the areas' present-day
navigability is not relevant; rather, navigability must solely be determined as of the
date of Arkansas's statehood because each state, upon entry into the union, took
title to the navigable waters within its borders. See generally Utah v. United States,
403 U.S. 9 (l 97 1); Anderson v. Reams, 204 Ark. 216, 161 S.W. 2d 957 (1942).
The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed that the concept of navigability for the
purpose of determining the public's right to use water was that static. Although
navigability to fix ownership of a river bed or riparian rights is determined as of
, the date of the state's entry into the union navigability for other purposes may arise
later. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408
(1940); Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 CaI. App. 3d
560,568, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835 (1976) ("navigability for purposes of a public
navigational easement need not be evaluated as of the date of statehood; it may
later arise"); Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App.2d 738, 743, 238 P,2d 128, 132
(1951) (if the evidence showed the creation of a new channel of the river, the fact
that there was no such channel (at statehood) would not prevent the assertion by
proper public authority of the right to use that channel for navigation and fishing");
65 C.J. S. Navigable Waters 12 at 68 (2000).  This point can be illustrated by the fact that,
in the following cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address navigability for
the purpose of public usage in terms of whether the water was navigable at the
time of statehood but whether the water was currently navigable. See State v.
McIlroy, supra; Hayes v. State, supra; Five Lakes Outing Club, Inc. v. Horseshoe
Lake Protective Ass 'n, 226 Ark. 13 6, 288 S. W.2d 942 (1956); McGahhey v.
McCollum, 207 Ark. 180, 179 S. W.2d 661 (1944).  One case phrased the question
of navigability as "whether the lake is susceptible of public servitude as a means of
transportation at either now or within the foreseeable future ... " Parker v. Moore,
, 222 Ark. 811 814, 262 S.W. 2d 891, 893 (1953). An argument is that an area's
navigability, in the sense that the public use it, is conclusively established by that
area’s status in 1836. 
The question, therefore, is the Little Red River navigable? If so, was it navigable in 
1836 (at Statehood)? If it is, and was, navigable then the State of Arkansas owns the bed
up to the normal high water mark. 
It appears that if the Little Red River was "navigable" at statehood then the
minerals lying in, under and upon the river bed are owned by the State of Arkansas. On
the other hand, i f  the river was not navigable at the date of statehood (1836), then all the
state (and the public) has is a right to the use the river surface, but the adjoining owners
of the river may own the minerals under the river bed. In any event, this seems like the
proper case for suspending the payment of royalties and, perhaps, for filing a declaratory
judgment action asking the court to declare who owns the mineral, i.e the State of
Arkansas or the adjoining owners.  The last I heard is that the State of Arkansas is now
claiming the minerals.
CONCLUSION
A big dose of Strohacker, probably some litigation involving forfeited mineral
interests, a little dab of adverse possession, issues surrounding ownership of minerals
under a world renowned trout fishing river, and a little controversy involving
administrative hearings are a happening right now.  We’ll keep you posted.
